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As the stalemate to pass comprehensive immigration reform
continues, day laborers are caught in a precarious position as states and
localities pass restrictive measures against immigrant populations,2
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1. See LUNA YASUI ET AL., NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, DRAFTING
DAY LABOR LEGISLATION: A GUIDE FOR ORGANIZERS AND ADVOCATES 8 (2004),
available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/652823341dclc5bf39_95m6ivpuz.pdf. "Day labor"
is defined as:
[L]abor or employment that is occasional or irregular, in which
an individual is employed for not longer than the period of
time required to complete the assignment for which the
individual was hired and in which wage payments are made
directly or indirectly to the day laborer by the day labor service
agency or by the third party employer, for work undertaken by
the day laborer. Day labor does not include labor or
employment of a professional or clerical nature.
Id.
2. See Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local
Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2008) ("In 2006, immigration
was the subject of at least 540 bills in twenty-seven states. The next year saw a
threefold increase in legislative activity, with more than 1,500 bills introduced in
state legislatures, and close to 250 becoming law." (citing DIRK HEGEN, IMMIGRANT
POLICY PROJECT: 2007 ENACTED STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND
IMMIGRATION (Ann Morse & Sheri Steisel eds., Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures 2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/
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including provisions meant to prevent day laborers soliciting
3
employment in public spaces such as sidewalks. These measures
implicate the First Amendment4 and bring up important questions
regarding when and to what extent the government may restrict a day
laborer's ability to solicit employment in public spaces. As many day
laborers rely on access to public spaces to find work,' the
constitutionality of government efforts to restrict where a day laborer
may seek employment directly affects whether day laborers in a
particular area continue to find regular work.6 Recent cases have shown
20071mmigrationfinal.pdf)).
3. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(A)-(B) (2010) (making it a
crime to hire someone as, or solicit employment from, the occupant of a motor
vehicle); REDONDO BEACH, CAL., CODE § 3-7.1601 (2010), available at
http://www.qcode.us/codes/redondobeach (making it "unlawful for any person to
stand on a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business,
or contributions from an occupant of any motor vehicle").
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
5. See ABEL VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE
UNITED STATES i (2006), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr
/csup/uploaded files/NatlDayLabor-On theCornerl.pdf
The vast majority (79 percent) of hiring sites are informal
and include workers standing in front of businesses (24
percent), home improvement stores (22 percent), gas
stations (10 percent) and on busy streets (8 percent). Most
of these sites are near residential neighborhoods. One in
five (21 percent) day laborers search for work at day-labor
worker centers.
Id.
6. Day laborers rely almost completely on the ability to make themselves
known and available to contractors because:
Fluctuations in the availability of work are endemic to the day-
labor market. The day-labor workforce is an entirely
contingent workforce; workers are hired only when employers
need them and the duration of the employment ""contract""
(which consists of nothing more than a verbal agreement) is
unsecured and open-ended. In other words, day laborers are
entirely at-will employees and employers are in no way bound
to honor promises of continuing employment, whether from
one day to the next or from one hour to the next.
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that courts are divided as to the validity of state and local measures
aimed at removing day laborers from public spaces. This Note
advocates two principal positions: first, that one recent Ninth Circuit case
validating an anti-day laborer ordinance, Comit de Jornaleros de
Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,8 was incorrectly decided and
on rehearing should be overturned; and second, that comprehensive
immigration reform is the superior means to address concerns about the
presence of immigrants, including many day laborers, in a way that
promotes, rather than restricts, the rights of day laborers and other
immigrant constituencies.
Although this Note provides a brief background of day laborers
and why they are the target of exclusionary statutes and ordinances, 9 the
Note primarily addresses how courts interpret and apply the First
Amendment to government efforts restricting a day laborer's conduct in
public spaces. This Note will also draw upon cases focusing on anti-
panhandling statutes as they help to illuminate how courts determine the
constitutionality of statutes limiting conduct in public spaces. Part I of
this Note discusses day laborers generally and their association with
immigration concerns nationwide and gives an overview of local statutes
targeting day laborers and how they implicate the First Amendment. Part
II describes how courts interpret the First Amendment and what tests are
used to determine the constitutionality of efforts to restrict day laborers'
conduct in public spaces. This section includes a discussion of cases
addressing anti-panhandling statutes, as these cases help flesh out how
courts view government action targeted at restricting activity in public
spaces. Part II also reviews how the particular nature of day labor calls
into question the validity of many court decisions affirming ordinances
restricting a day laborer's ability to solicit employment. This section
further addresses how a day laborer's solicitation of employment is both
similar and distinct from other conduct commonly discussed in pertinent
Id. at 6.
7. See discussion Parts 11.B.1-2.
8. 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010), reh'g granted en banc, 623 F.3d 1054 (9th
Cir. 2010); see discussion Part l1.B.1(providing a detailed discussion of this case).
9. See Gregg W. Kettles, Day Labor Markets and Public Space, 78 UMKC L.
REv. 139, 143 (2009) ("Policy responses by local government and civic-minded
non-profit organizations [toward day laborers] have tended to take one of two forms:
exclusion or shelter.").
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categories of cases such as panhandling and public solicitation of
donations. Part III focuses on how courts have decided whether
"reasonable alternatives"' 0 exist for day laborers to find employment in
lieu of using public spaces. It addresses why day laborers should be
allowed to continue to solicit employment in public spaces as well as
why the development of workers' centers meant to provide a more
protected and structured system of employment for day laborers is a
positive development but insufficient to meet the needs of many day
laborers. Finally, Part IV presents the conclusion that although the
constitutional viability of government efforts to exclude day laborers
from public spaces is uncertain, such efforts are based on misconceptions
of the public nuisance caused by day laborers and immigrants generally.
Part IV also argues that comprehensive immigration reform at the federal
level is preferable to state and local government bodies attempting to
regulate their immigrant populations.
I. DAY LABORERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Before discussing the First Amendment analysis used by courts
to address statutes targeted at day laborers, a brief background about day
laborers generally and why they have drawn the attention of state and
local governments is helpful. Day laborers often connote a group of
Latino men" gathered on a sidewalk, street corner, or in a parking lot,
seeking employment from passing vehicles for various manual labor
jobs.12 Although this conception is largely accurate on its face,13 the
10. For those affected by the restrictive statute in question, the existence of
"reasonable alternatives" to achieve their stated goals is one of the considerations
courts use to determine whether the statute is an acceptable limitation on First
Amendment rights. See discussion infra Part II.A-B and Part Ill.
11. One of the most cited surveys on day laborer demographics found that two
percent of day laborers are female. VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at 17. For an
argument that the majority-female field of informal domestic services, such as
house-cleaning and child care, should be considered a part of day labor generally,
see Elizabeth J. Kennedy, The Invisible Corner: Expanding Workplace Rights for
Female Day Laborers, 31 BERKELEY J. EmP. & LAB. L. 126 (2010).
12. See VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at i; see generally, DICK J. REAVIS,
CATCHING OUT: THE SECRET WORLD OF DAY LABORERS 174-77 (2010) (discussing
the similarities and differences between the informal market of most immigrant day
laborers and the approximately 800,000 to 1.4 million temporary workers, including
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association between day laborers and the Latino immigrant community
has led to an assumption that all day laborers are undocumented resident
aliens.14 In addition, the presence of day laborers also symbolizes
significant demographic shifts that have resulted in major increases in the
immigrant population, especially in many non-border states.1
"specialized skill temps" and some day laborers, that find employment through
agencies and labor halls).
13. See VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at 18. The report states:
[Day laborers are] largely comprised of migrants from Mexico
and Central America . . . . More than half (59 percent) of day
laborers were born in Mexico, 14 percent were born in
Guatemala and 8 percent were born in Honduras. United
States-born workers comprise 7 percent of the day-labor
workforce, though in the southern region of the country,
almost one in five day laborers was born in the United States.
Id.
14. Although the available evidence shows that the majority of day laborers
are unauthorized, more than a quarter of day laborers either have legal status or have
a pending application to adjust their status. See Monica W. Varsanyi, Immigration
Policing Through the Backdoor: City Ordinances, The "Right to the City, " and the
Exclusion of Undocumented Day Laborers, 29 URB. GEOG. 29, 31 (2008)
("[A]pproximately three-quarters of the day labor workforce is estimated to be
unauthorized, and 60% have been in the United States for five years or less.").
Varsanyi goes as far as to say that "the term 'day laborer' has become synonymous
with 'illegal immigrant' in popular discourse." Id. at 32; see also VALENZUELA,
supra note 5, at 18. The report found that:
Three-quarters of the day-labor workforce are undocumented
migrants . . . . [A]bout II percent of the undocumented day-
labor workforce has a pending application for an adjustment of
their immigration status. It was not possible to determine how
many of these workers may indeed be eligible for temporary or
permanent immigration relief.
Id.
15. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REv. 567, 569 n.1 (2008) ("Since 1990, more immigrants
have entered the United States than at any other point in the nation's history.").
16. See Varsanyi, supra note 14, at 31 (stating that, in regard to the specific
increase in the Mexican immigrant community, "the Mexican immigrant population
(both legal and undocumented) in "nongateway" states grew dramatically between
1990 and 2000, ranging from 200%-400% in New York, Washington, and
Wisconsin to more than 1800% in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama"
(citation omitted)); see also Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 594 ("In the same way that
immigrants often seek to insulate themselves from the challenges of life in a new
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Due to fears that immigrant populations, such as those
represented by gathered groups of day laborers, pose various problems to
the community,17 some states and localities have used their police power
to develop what law professor Juliet P. Stumpf termed "crimmigration
law." Stumpf observed that "criminal law has been a central locus for
state and local attempts to curb unwanted immigration." 9 For day
laborers, this means statutes and ordinances passed to remove them from
public spaces.20 Statutes targeting day laborers add another to the host of
challenges they already face, such as low rates of pay, 2' dangerous work
22 23conditions, and job security challenges. Given the precarious
economic position of day laborers, deciding the constitutionality under
the First Amendment of state and local efforts to exclude day laborers
from public spaces, and thus increasing the difficulty of finding
employment, has grave consequences for day laborers and immigrant
communities generally.
society by relying on networks of co-ethnics, local communities are attempting to
insulate themselves from demographic changes that feel overwhelming.").
17. See Kettles, supra note 9, at 143 ("The supposed harms [caused by day
laborers] fall into three general categories: accidents, petty nuisance, and
immigration.").
18. See Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1587 ("[T]he most significant way in which
federal immigration law has transformed itself into domestic law, accessible to the
states, is through its expanding intersection with criminal law.").
19. Id.
20. See Kettles, supra note 9, at 144 ("Localities have also attempted to avoid
the public harms threatened by day laborers by enforcing against them ordinances
restricting solicitation on streets, sidewalks, and parking lots.").
21. See VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at ii (finding that most day laborers make
no more than $15,000 annually).
22. See id. at 12-13 ("One in five day laborers has suffered an injury while on
the job . . .. Among day laborers who have been injured on the job in the past year,
more than half (54 percent) did not receive the medical care they needed for the
injury.. .. ").
23. See id. at 6 ("Fluctuations in the availability of work are endemic to the
day-labor market . . . [because] day laborers are entirely at-will employees and
employers are in no way bound to honor promises of continuing employment,
whether from one day to the next or from one hour to the next.").
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A. Do First Amendment Protections Apply to Unauthorized Workers
Immigrants?
As many day laborers are unauthorized workers,24 one key
threshold question is whether First Amendment protections apply to
unauthorized workers. For over half-a-century, the Supreme Court has
held that First Amendment protections apply to lawfully-admitted
25
immigrants. However, the Court has also addressed constitutional
protections applied to unauthorized workers, specifically in the language
26
of the landmark Supreme Court case Plyler v. Doe. In Plyler, the Court
stated that "[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country is
unlawful, have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process
,,27
of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The critical issue
appears to be that the First Amendment refers to "people" as opposed to
"citizens," thus supporting the contention that First Amendment
28
protections apply to immigrants regardless of status. Most of the
24. Id. at 17 ("Three-quarters of the day-labor workforce are undocumented
migrants.").
25. See Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953). The Court stated:
[O]nce an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he
becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights
include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments
and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction
between citizens and resident aliens.
Id.; see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) ("Freedom of speech and
of press is accorded aliens residing in this country."); Parcham v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 769 F.2d 1001, 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It has long been held
that aliens residing in this country enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.").
26. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
27. Id. at 210.
28. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045,
1063-64 (9th Cir. 1995). The court stated:
The Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between
aliens in the United States and those seeking to enter from
outside the country, and has accorded to aliens living in the
United States those protections of the Bill of Rights that are
not, by the text of the Constitution, restricted to citizens.
Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
271 (1990) (stating, when deciding whether Fourth Amendment protections apply to
681
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principal cases discussed in this Note do not address whether the First
Amendment applies to unauthorized immigrant workers. However, one
case that does touch on the issue held that regardless of whether the First
Amendment applies to individual authorized immigrant workers, the
plaintiff included an appropriate organization with valid organizational
standing,29 and find that First Amendment protections apply to
unauthorized workers.3 0
B. Statutes and Ordinances Infringing on First Amendment Protections
As solicitation is a "communicative activity,"31 government
attempts to prevent day laborers from soliciting employment in public
forums implicate First Amendment protections. The number of states
and localities drafting and passing such measures targeted at day laborers
appears to be increasing.32 As localities within states like New York,33
an undocumented immigrant, that constitutional protections apply to immigrants,
regardless of status, "when they have come within the territory of the United States
and developed substantial connections with the country"). If the ability of an
unauthorized day laborer to bring a First Amendment claim was contested, one
response could be to establish the voluntary presence of the party and describe the
connection the day laborer has to community, such as parenting U.S. citizen children
or membership in a local church or organization, in addition to the time spent living
in the U.S. For a discussion of day laborers involvement in their local communities,
see VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at iii ("Day laborers are active members of their
communities. Half (52 percent) of all day laborers attend church regularly, one-fifth
(22 percent) are involved in sports clubs and one-quarter (26 percent) participate in
community worker centers."); but cf La Asociacion De Trabajadores De Lake v.
City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2010) (addressing the issue of
organizational standing and holding that for an organization to have standing it must
either assert a valid claim on behalf of its members or show that its use of resources
and its mission is affected by defendant's conduct).
29. See Comit6 de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,
607 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2010), reh'g granteden banc, 623 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding that as at least one of the plaintiff organizations has standing, there is
no need to address the standing of other organizations).
30. See discussion infra Parts 11A-B, Part 111.
31. See Kettles, supra note 9, at 144 (stating that as solicitation is a kind of
"communicative activity, laws restricting it implicate the First Amendment").
32. See Arturo Gonzalez, Day Labor in the Golden State, CAL. EcON. POL'Y,
July 2007, at 13, available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/cep
/EP_707AGEP.pdf ("Nearly 60 California cities have ordinances that limit
solicitation by workers or employers, and other cities are considering this strategy.").
682 [Vol. 9
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California, 34 and Virginia3 5 adopt statutes limiting and, at times,
criminalizing a day laborer's use of public spaces to solicit
36
employment, numerous lawsuits have been filed challenging the
constitutionality of these statutes.37  The First Amendment inquiries
advanced in these suits include the issue of when government action
meant to promote a state interest, such as safety, may trump intrusion on
traditionally protected activities, such as speech or assembly.
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH, PUBLIC FoRA, AND THE NATURE OF DAY
LABOR: How SOME COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED ANTI-DAY LABORER
RESTRICTIONS
A. Does a Day Laborer Soliciting Employment Constitute Commercial
Speech?
A day laborer present on a street corner or sidewalk attempting
to find employment raises important questions regarding the type of
speech and conduct involved. This is because a court could hold that
33. See Robin Finn, Town Divides Over Law Aimed at Day Laborers, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at MBI (discussing the town of Oyster Bay, New York,
passing Ordinance 205-32 which imposed a fine for ""'approaching motor vehicles
or standing in public roads facing in the direction of oncoming traffic"' to solicit
employment).
34. See Gonzalez, supra note 32, at 13-14.
35. See generally Amy Pritchard, "We are Your Neighbors": How
Communities Can Best Address a Growing Day-Labor Workforce, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR
Soc. JusT. 371 (2008) (discussing an anti-solicitation ordinance passed by the town
of Herndon, Virginia, and subsequent litigation that struck down the ordinance).
36. See Judge Blocks Law in Oyster Bay Aimed at Day Laborers, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2010, at A22 (discussing a temporary restraining order issued against an
anti-solicitation ordinance passed by the city of Oyster Bay, New York, and stating
that "[t]he law criminalized and provided a $250 fine for soliciting work on public
streets").
37. See, e.g., Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1036 (D.
Ariz. 2008) (striking down Section 72.17(C) of the Town Code of Cave Creek,
Arizona, prohibiting standing on a street and soliciting employment from a passing
vehicle on the grounds that this was a content-based restriction and did not pass strict
scrutiny); Comit6 de Jornaleros de Glendale v. City of Glendale, No. CV 04-3521,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46603 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2005) (granting a permanent
injunction against the City of Glendale regarding § 9.17.030 of the Glendale
Municipal Code, an anti-solicitation ordinance targeted at day laborers).
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such activity constitutes either commercial speech or non-commercial
speech. The distinction affects the level of scrutiny applied, as shown
by City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network.39 In that case, the Court
stated that the "'Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression."' 40 To determine whether speech is commercial, courts use a
41
three-factor test from Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corporation,
which requires deciding "whether the speech is an advertisement,
whether the speech refers to specific goods or services, and whether the
speaker has an economic motivation for the speech."42  If speech is
deemed commercial, restrictions on that speech are subjected to a form
of intermediate scrutiny.4 3 The key case addressing commercial speech,
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission of New York,44 formulated the test determining the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech as:
The State must assert a substantial interest to be
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech ...
the regulatory technique must be in proportion to
that interest . . .. Compliance with this requirement
may be measured by two criteria. First, the
restriction must directly advance the state interest
involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it
38. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) ("[T]he
degree of protection afforded by the First Amendment depends on whether the
activity sought to be regulated constitutes commercial or non-commercial speech ...
."); see also, Kathryn Nicole Lewis, Student Work, Streets of Wrath: The
Constitutionality of the Town of Jupiter's Non-Solicitation Ordinance, 37 STETSON
L. REV. 471, 479 (2008) ("Commercial speech is speech that does no more than
propose a business transaction and is limited to the promotion of goods or services."
(citation omitted)); Gabriela Garcia Kornzweig, Commercial Speech in the Street:
Regulation of Day Labor Solicitation, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 499, 506-07 (2000)
("Speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction" is
constitutionally protected as commercial speech.' (citation omitted)).
39. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
40. Id. at 415 (1993) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
41. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
42. See Lewis, supra note 38, at 497 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67).
43. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
44. Id. at 563.
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provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government's purpose. Second, if the governmental
interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive
restrictions cannot survive.45
There has been some debate regarding whether the final prong of
this test requires the government to use the "least restrictive means" to
achieve its substantial interest.46 Although the Court has not explicitly
applied the "least restrictive means test," it has struck down restrictions
on commercial speech by finding that the government could achieve its
stated goals through less restrictive measures.4 7  This trend has
encouraged some commentators to advocate for finding that day labor
solicitation constitutes commercial speech as the Court's track record
would indicate a practice of invalidating restrictions of commercial
48
speech based on the availability of less restrictive alternatives.
However, courts have been reluctant to find that day laborer solicitation
constitutes commercial speech. 4 9  Even if a day laborer soliciting
45. Id. at 564. An important consideration for the Court is whether a less
restrictive measure could achieve the government's stated interest. Id.; see also
Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) ("It is perfectly obvious
that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech
would be more likely to achieve the State's goal. . . ."); Kornzweig, supra note 38,
at 508-13 (discussing how the Court has applied and adapted the Central Hudson
test as to the standard of review applied to commercial speech).
46. See Kornzweig, supra note 38, at 509; see also, e.g., City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) ("To repeat ... while we
have rejected the 'least-restrictive-means' test for judging restrictions on commercial
speech, so too have we rejected mere rational-basis review.").
47. See Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507; Kornzweig, supra note 38, at 508-13
(discussing how the Court has applied and adapted the Central Hudson test as to the
standard of review applied to commercial speech).
48. See Lewis, supra note 38, at 476 (discussing how an ordinance passed by
the town of Jupiter, Florida is a "regulation on commercial speech"); Kornzweig,
supra note 38, at 506 (stating that a day laborer's solicitation of employment
constitutes commercial speech).
49. See Comit6 de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,
607 F.3d 1178, 1184 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010), reh'g granted en banc, 623 F.3d 1054 (9th
Cir. 2010) (finding that the ordinance at issue does not implicate commercial speech
because: (1) the plaintiffs did not contend that the day laborers constituted
commercial speech and (2) the ordinance was not expressly limited to regulate
686 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 9
employment is not considered commercial speech, there are other First
Amendment inquiries to consider.
B. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions: When May the Government
Restrict a Day Laborer's Ability to Solicit Employment in a Public
Forum?
In some key cases addressing day laborer solicitation, there is a
considerable difference of opinion among judges regarding what
standard of review to apply to day laborer activity and how to apply the
selected standard.o If typical day laborer activity is not considered
51
commercial speech, then the extent to which a government may
regulate the activity depends in part on the area in which the day laborer
conducts his activity.
The critical inquiry is determining in what type of forum a day
laborer's solicitation occurs.53 Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educators' Association54 established three different forums
associated with different kinds of public property and specific factors to
determine the validity of restrictions on speech and access to these
different forums. The first category, of most importance to day laborers,
is a traditional public forum, which includes most public streets,
55 56
including residential streets, sidewalks and public parks. However,
"purely commercial expression" (quoting S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d
1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 1998))).
50. See discussion infra Part II.B.I.
51. See discussion supra Part II.A.
52. See generally Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992) ("[I]t is ... well settled that the government need not permit all forms of
speech on property that it owns and controls." (citing Postal Service v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976))).
53. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 678 (stating that the Court's treatment of restrictions
on expression taking place on government owned property is subject to a "forum
based" analysis).
54. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
55. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) ("[A]ll public streets are
held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora.").
56. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have
been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to
2011] TIME, PLACE, & MANNER OF SURVIVAL
the government's ability to restrict expressive activities extends to public
spaces and traditional public forums.5 In addressing the issue of the
extent to which the government may restrict speech activities, the Court
in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence wrote that
"[e]xpression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is
subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions., 59 Day laborers
engage in expressive conduct when gathering in public spaces as a means
to find employment. Such activity is a form of solicitation, as day
laborers actively engage and negotiate with passing motorists or other
parties to contract for a day's work.60 However, courts generally have
found that solicitation is a type of expression that has the same
protections as other forms of traditionally protected speech.61 In light of
limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. At one end
of the spectrum are streets and parks which 'have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.'
Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). Generally,
Perry finds that there are three general types of public property forums: (1)
traditional public forums like streets and parks; (2) designated public forums like
government buildings generally open for public use; and (3) non-public forums like
government buildings not generally open to the public. Id. at 45-46; but see United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727-28 (1990) (distinguishing a sidewalk leading to
an entrance for post office employees from Schultz in finding that the post office
sidewalk did not constitute a traditional public forum as it was built for the unique
purpose of allowing post office patrons to enter and not intended for general public
use).
57. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[E]ven in a
public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
or manner of protected speech . . . ."); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 678 ("Where the
government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than
acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be
subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be
subject.").
58. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
59. Id. at 293.
60. See VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at i-iii (discussing the various aspects of
the day laborer's life in America).
61. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) ("Solicitation is a
recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment." (citation omitted));
ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2006) ("It is beyond
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this finding, the issue becomes when the government may enact a valid
restriction on speech in a public forum.
First Amendment protections extend to action taken by both the
federal government and state governments. In First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,62 the Supreme Court stated that the right to free speech
"is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 6 3 Thus, courts use the same "time, place, or
manner" considerations for local, state, or federal action restricting
speech in public areas. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,64 the Court
stated that:
Our cases make clear, however, that even in a
public forum the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of protected speech, provided the
restrictions "are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of
the information."6 5
dispute that solicitation is a form of expression entitled to the same constitutional
protections as traditional speech." (citations omitted)); see also Vill. of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) ("[S]olicitation is
characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech
seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political,
or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such
information and advocacy would likely cease."); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 409 (1974) (per curiam) (stating that the First Amendment free speech
protection reaches conduct if the conduct is "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication . . ."); Pritchard, supra note 35, at 381 ("The Supreme Court has
held that in order for conduct to be protected by the First Amendment, there must be
both intent to convey a particular message and a great likelihood that those around
will understand the message, given surrounding circumstances.").
62. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
63. Id. at 779; see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45 n.1 (1994)
("The Fourteenth Amendment makes this limitation applicable to the States.").
64. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
65. Id. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)); see also Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 ("[R]estrictions are valid provided
that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
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Based on Ward, restrictions on the "time, place, or manner" of
speech must first address whether the restriction is content-neutral or
content-based. Here, "[t]he Government's purpose [for promulgating the
restriction] is the controlling consideration."6 6 The inquiry at this stage
is to understand whether the government has passed the restriction
because it specifically opposes the content of the speech at issue or
whether the restriction passed due to reasons unrelated to the content of
the speech or expression.67 When a restriction is contested on First
Amendment grounds the government, as the body restricting conduct
generally protected by the First Amendment, bears the burden of
showing why the restriction is valid.68
For day laborers, the question of whether a statutory restriction is
content-neutral will often turn on whether the restriction focuses on day
laborer solicitation of employment, specifically, or restricts all forms of
solicitation generally. In the non-day laborer context, one example of
where a court has found an anti-solicitation ordinance to be content-
neutral is Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v.
Saint Louis County. This addressed a challenge to part of St. Louis
County's traffic code that prohibited the solicitation of employment and
charitable donations from occupants of vehicles. 70 The court summarily
stated with little analysis that the traffic code was "clearly neutral as to
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.").
66. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
67. Id. The Ward Court stated:
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ...
is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys . . . . A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to
the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has
an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others.
Id.
68. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) ("In the
context of governmental restriction of speech, it has long been established that the
government cannot limit speech protected by the First Amendment without bearing
the burden of showing that its restriction is justified.").
69. 930 F.2d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 1991).
70. Id. at 593.
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the content of the regulated speech."7 However, in Lopez v. Town of
Cave Creek discussed in more detail infra, the court found a similarly
worded regulation to be content-based. The court found the regulation at
issue "differentiate[d] based on the content of speech on its face,"
because "[i]t prohibit[ed] solicitation speech, but not political, religious,
artistic, or other categories of speech."nAnother factor that courts use to
determine whether a restriction is content-neutral is whether the
restriction serves some compelling government interest. 7 4 One author
notes that "[o]ver the years, the courts have identified a myriad of
significant or substantial government interests, including crime
prevention, fraud prevention, privacy protection, traffic safety, and the
need to control traffic flow." 75 In drafting restrictions, it seems that to
pass constitutional muster local and state governments are encouraged to
pass broader measures that ban all types of solicitation, as opposed to
76
singling out specific efforts by day laborers. However, even when
drafting broad anti-solicitation statutes, government entities must be
mindful of the final prong of First Amendment test for "time, place, or
manner" restrictions, which is to allow for sufficient alternative means of
communication.7 7
1. Comit6 de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo
Beach
One of the most recent cases to address the First Amendment
implications of ordinances intended to limit a day laborer's ability to
solicit employment in public spaces was Comit de Jornaleros de
71. Id. at 594.
72. 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2008).
73. Id. at 1032.
74. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (quoting Clark v.
Cmt. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293)(1984).
75. See Lewis, supra note 38, at 489-90.
76. Id. at 511-12 (discussing how certain ordinances targeting day laborers are
drafted so broadly in criminalizing public solicitation that they would likely not be
considered "narrowly tailored" by reviewing courts).
77. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
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Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach.8 This case involved the
constitutionality of Redondo Beach Municipal Code §37.1601," which
makes it a crime to "stand[] on a street or highway and solicit[]
employment, business, or contributions from the occupants of an
automobile.",80 The Middle District Court of California found the
ordinance to be content-neutral,8 1  but in the end held it as
unconstitutional after finding that "the Ordinance [was] not narrowly
tailored to address the City's asserted interests nor d[id] it leave open
ample alternative channels for the speech it proscribes."82 Afterward, the
Ninth Circuit took the case on appeal and reversed the district court,
finding the ordinance to be constitutional.
The Ninth Circuit's decision to rehear Comitd de Jornaleros en
banc84 suggests that there is some disagreement over the outcome in
78. 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010). This case is of particular importance as it
was cited in United States v. Arizona as the basis for disallowing First Amendment
arguments to be heard in response to sections of Arizona's controversial SB 1070
law, which made it a crime for day laborers to solicit employment. See United States
v. Ariz., 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1000 n.16 (D. Ariz. 2010) (finding that Comitd de
Jornaleros "foreclose[d]" First Amendment challenges to parts of SB 1070
preventing day laborers from soliciting employment on public property).
79. The pertinent part of Redondo Beach Municipal Code § 3-7.1601 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to stand on a street or
highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment,
business, or contributions from an occupant of any motor
vehicle. For purposes of this section, "street or highway" shall
mean all of that area dedicated to public use for public street
purposes and shall include, but not be limited to, roadways,
parkways, medians, alleys, sidewalks, curbs, and public ways.
Comit de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1181.
80. Id. at 1180.
81. Comit6 de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F.
Supp. 2d 952, 961 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
82. Id. at 970.
83. Comite de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1196 ("The district court erred . . . in
holding that the Redondo Beach ordinance was not narrowly tailored and did not
leave open ample alternative channels of communication. We also hold that the
Redondo Beach ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague.").
84. Comit6 de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, No.
06-55750, 06-56869, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21347 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2010). The
Ninth Circuit en banc heard oral arguments in this case on March 21, 2011. United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Status of Pending En Banc Cases,
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/enbanc (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
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Comit de Jornaleros. In addition, Comiti de Jornaleros provides insight
on how courts decide whether a restriction on protected speech is
content-based or content-neutral, whether a statute contains a valid time,
place, and manner restriction, what other alternative means exist for
those affected by restrictions, and what other First Amendment
considerations should be considered.
Comiti de Jornaleros centered on the city of Redondo Beach's
attempt to address problems allegedly associated with the ongoing
presence of day laborers. In Comite de Jornaleros, the Ninth Circuit
wrote that "[a] memorandum from the city attorney to the mayor
explained that 'the City has had extreme difficulties with persons
soliciting employment from the sidewalks... over the last several years.
There can be little question that traffic and safety hazards occur by this
practice. After passing the full version of Redondo Beach Municipal
Code §37.1601 in 1989,8 aimed at preventing groups of day laborers
from gathering on public streets, the city "continued to experience traffic
problems related to persons soliciting employment from automobiles at
,87
two of the city's intersections." Due to these persistent problems, the
city decided to increase its enforcement of the ordinance. This included
heightening the presence of city police officers "sometimes posing as
potential employers." After Redondo Beach police officers arrested
multiple day laborers for violating the ordinance at issue, two groups, the
Comit6 de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach (Committee of Redondo Beach
Day Laborers) and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network
89
(NDLON), filed suit "alleg[ing] that the Redondo Beach ordinance
85. Comitd de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1181. The court cites the city attorney as
arguing that "the 'ordinance was designed to alleviate sidewalk congestion and
traffic hazards which occurred when large numbers of persons congregated on the
sidewalks during the rush hours to obtain temporary employment."' Id.
86. Id. Earlier in the 1980's the City of Redondo Beach passed what is now
subsection (a) of § 37.1601, addressing day laborers" solicitation of employment
from motorists. In 1989 the city added what is now subsection (b), which makes it a
crime for a motorist to hire a day laborer while using or stopped on a public street.
Id.
87. Id. at 1182.
8 8. Id.
89. Regarding the composition of these two groups, the court stated that the
"Comit6 [de Jomaleros de Redondo Beach] identifie[d] itself as "an unincorporated
association comprised of day laborers who . . . regularly seek work in the City of
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deprived them and others of free speech rights guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments . . ."90
In Comit de Jornaleros, as well as other cases,91 the Ninth
Circuit focused its analysis on the impact of restricting a person's ability
to solicit employment in a traditional public forum, such as city or town
sidewalks.92 The Supreme Court has recognized that a traditional public
forum invites special concern regarding government efforts to restrict
First Amendment protections in those public forums.9 3 However, the
Ninth Circuit in Comit de Jornaleros focused on the ability of
government bodies to impose restrictions on the right to speak under
certain circumstances. The majority reiterated that the Supreme Court
carved out certain allowable restrictions on speech, even in public areas,
based on the time, place, or manner of the speech. 94
However, such restrictions must pass a form of intermediate
scrutiny. This is because a court must find that the restrictions pass the
following three key tests: the court must find that the restrictions "are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
Redondo Beach," and NDLON identifie[d] itself as "a nationwide coalition of day
laborers and the agencies that work with day laborers."' Id. at 1182.
90. Id.
91. See also Town of Herndon v. Thomas, MI-2007-644, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS
161, at *14 (Va. Cir. Aug. 29, 2007) (addressing the impact of the town ordinance on
public spaces).
92. See Comit de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1184-85 (stating the "assum[ption]
that the streets of Redondo Beach constitute a perpetual public forum, even when
they are in use by vehicular traffic"). To support this assumption the court states
"[a]ll public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered
traditional public fora." Id. (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)).
93. See Comit de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1182, 1200 (citing Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. , _, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009)) (finding that
"[t]he government's power to pass laws, regulations, or ordinances affecting speech
in these areas [public fora] is . . . strictly limited"); see also Capitol Square Rev. &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (stating that, in regards to a public
fora, "a State's right to limit protected expressive activity is sharply circumscribed . .
94. Comite de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1184 (discussing that the government
can make certain time, place, or manner restrictions provided such restrictions pass
the tests articulated in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
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and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication
of the information."9 5
Many ordinances affecting day laborers, such as the one at issue
in Comit de Jornaleros, seek to prohibit and in some cases criminalize a
day laborer's search for employment, which often occurs through
engaging in conversation with pedestrians or people in motor vehicles to
solicit employment. 96 In considering statutory restrictions on solicitation
in public spaces, the majority in Comit de Jornaleros stated that "we
have long recognized [that solicitation] is a form of expression that
consists of both expressive content and associated conduct or acts."9  In
finding that solicitation consists of both words and acts, the majority in
ComWit de Jornaleros stated that "[t]he 'words' component of solicitation
includes both written and spoken communications." 98 In regards to the
"acts" aspect of solicitation, the majority focuses on the fusion of the act
of solicitation itself along with the act's effect in stating "[t]he 'acts'
component of solicitation includes the conduct of the person soliciting
... [and] also includes the effects of such conduct, such as impeding the
flow of traffic . . . ."99 The majority reasons that, although solicitation by
its very nature includes the combination of both content (words) and
conduct (acts), "[t]he dual nature of solicitation does not change the fact
that solicitation is a form of expression and '[e]xpression, whether oral or
written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions.',
100
The majority in Comite de Jornaleros uses a holding from a
previous Ninth Circuit case, ACORN v. City of Phoenix,01 to support its
finding that the restriction at issue in the Redondo Beach ordinance is
95. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (validating a noise control measure enacted by New York
City limiting the allowable noise level of an amphitheater in Central Park so as not
to unduly disturb nearby residents).
96. VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that "[m]ore than three-quarters of
day laborers (79 percent) congregate at informal hiring sites that have formed in
front of home improvement stores and gas stations, along busy thoroughfares and
near expressway onramps, and in parks and other public spaces").
97. Comite de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1184.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
101. 798 F.2d 1260, 1273 (9th Cir.1986).
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"4content neutral.,,102 At issue in ACORN was an ordinance passed by the
city of Phoenix prohibiting people on public streets from soliciting
donations from passing motorists in a practice known as "tagging."
10 3
The Ninth Circuit in Comit de Jornaleros, in its "content neutrality"
analysis, found the ordinance, conduct restricted by the ordinance, the
government interest involved, and the method of enforcement at issue in
ACORN sufficiently analogous to the City of Redondo Beach's
ordinance targeted at day laborers and, thus, held that ACORN was
controlling.104 One key reason that the Ninth Circuit found ACORN
controlling centered on the holding that dangers associated with
"tagging" are similar to the dangers associated with day laborers
soliciting employment from passing cars.105 However, Judge Wardlaw,
the dissenting judge in Comit de Jornaleros, made a compelling
argument regarding the distinction between the ordinance at issue in
102. Comite de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1187 (holding that "[b]ecause there is
no meaningful distinction between the Phoenix ordinance and the Redondo Beach
ordinance as drafted, interpreted, and enforced, we conclude that the Redondo Beach
ordinance is likewise aimed at acts, does not single out particular ideas for
differential treatment, and is content neutral").
103. ACORN, 798 F.2d at 1262 ("'Tagging' usually involves an individual
stepping into the street and approaching an automobile when it is stopped at a red
traffic light. The individual asks the occupants of the vehicle for a contribution to
ACORN and distributes a slip of paper, or 'tag,' providing information about
ACORN and its activities.").
104. Comit de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1190. The court stated that:
Redondo Beach, like Phoenix, contends that the key purposes
of the ordinance are to avoid disruptions of traffic and to
address safety concerns . . . . Our conclusion in ACORN that
solicitation demanding an immediate response from drivers
increases the risks of traffic disruption and injury is equally
applicable to Redondo Beach. Nothing in the record suggests
that solicitation for employment raises a less significant risk of
disruption in traffic flow than solicitation for contributions.
And, as in ACORN, we find that an ordinance prohibiting in-
person demands requiring an immediate response from vehicle
occupants, but allowing the distribution of literature to those
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ACORN and that in Comitd de Jornaleros.10 6 Judge Wardlaw found that,
given the greater breadth and limiting effect of the ordinance passed by
the city of Redondo Beach, the holding in ACORN should not be
controlling. 0 7 She focused on the fact that "[Redondo Beach's]
Ordinance 'sweeps in a much larger amount of solicitation speech and
speech-related conduct than the ordinance at issue in ACORN.""o Thus,
Judge Wardlaw emphasized that as the Redondo Beach ordinance
restricted all forms of solicitation in all public areas of the city, it had a
far broader and more devastating impact than the limited anti-fundraising
ordinance in ACORN and thus the majority erred in finding ACORN
controlling.'09
On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit should follow the line of
reasoning advocated in Judge Wardlaw's dissent and thus find the
Redondo Beach ordinance unconstitutional. This is for a number of
reasons. First, on rehearing the Ninth Circuit should follow Judge
Wardlaw's reasoning that ACORN does not control for the reasons stated
above. Because ACORN should not be controlling, the Ninth Circuit
should find, as Judge Wardlaw did," 0 that the Redondo Beach ordinance
is not narrowly tailored and is instead over-inclusive. Second, the Ninth
Circuit should follow Judge Wardlaw's finding that "[t]he Ordinance
effectively eliminates the only means by which day laborers can
communicate their availability for employment."'' Finally, Judge
106. Id. at 1999 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he district court
specifically rejected the City's contention that our opinion in ACORN v. City of
Phoenix was controlling precedent, correctly determining that ACORN involved an
'as-applied' challenge and was otherwise distinguishable on its facts").
107. Comite de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1203 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) ("The
majority's use of ACORN to justify the application of the Ordinance to their
activities . . . [is] directly contrary to controlling precedent . . . . ACORN did not
address the broader question that we are now called to answer.").
108. Id. at 1203 (quoting Comit6 de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of
Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952, 964-65 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).
109. Comild de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1203 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (finding
that as the Redondo Beach ordinance prohibits solicitation of employment in all
public areas of the city, it sweeps more broadly than the ordinance at issue in
ACORN and should be distinguished).
110. Id. at 1205-06 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (finding that the ordinance goes
further than necessary to address the city's interests "in traffic flow and safety" and
thus is "overinclusive").
111. Id. at 1209 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
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Wardlaw correctly states the vital importance of access to public areas
for people with limited resources by stating that "as places where
individuals may express themselves without regard to the resources of
the speaker or popularity of the message, traditional public fora serve as
the main bulwark of the First Amendment." 112 She also cites Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee," 3 where he wrote that "'[o]ne of the primary
purposes of the public forum is to provide persons who lack access to
more sophisticated media the opportunity to speak."" 14 By following
Judge Wardlaw's approach in its decision on rehearing, the Ninth Circuit
will make a decision that is both more accurate regarding First
Amendment jurisprudence and mindful of the need for day laborers to
have effective access to employment opportunities.115
2. Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, Arizona
Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, Arizonall6 is another case
focusing on a local ordinance targeting day laborers. This district court
case focused on a motion for preliminary injunction toward the ordinance
at issue and provides a different conclusion than that of Comit6 de
Jornaleros regarding the constitutionality of a similarly worded
ordinance targeted at day laborers. The Lopez court found that the
ordinance at issue is content-based 1 7 and found that the ordinance does
not pass strict scrutiny. Thus, the Lopez court provides a potential
rationale as to why the Ninth Circuit, upon rehearing Comitd de
112. Id. at 1200 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
113. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
114. Comit de Jornaleros, 607 F.3d at 1200 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting)
(quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 708
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
115. Judge Wardlaw analyzed the majority opinion by succinctly stating: "The
majority tramples upon the right of free speech in the most traditional of public
fora." Id. at 1212.
116. 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (D. Ariz. 2008).
117. Id. at 1032.
118. Id. at 1034.
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Jornaleros, should find the ordinance passed by Redondo Beach
unconstitutional.119
At issue in Lopez is the fact that the town of Cave Creek
"adopted Section 72.17(C) of the Town Code . . . Section 72.17(C)
makes it unlawful for '[any] person [] to stand on or adjacent to a street
or highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business or
contributions from the occupant of any vehicle."' 1 20 Regarding the
plaintiffs who filed suit, the court wrote that "[p]laintiffs are day laborers
who have obtained and desire to continue to obtain employment in ways
prohibited by the Ordinance."1 2 1
Whereas the court in ComitW de Jornaleros found the ordinance
at issue to be content-neutral, the court in Lopez found a similarly
worded ordinance, Section 72.17(C) of the Town Code, to be a "content-
based" restriction, thus necessitating a strict scrutiny analysis and making
the statute presumptively unconstitutional.122 The Lopez court, citing
ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas (ACLU 11),123 wrote that a
"'solicitation ordinance is content-based if either the main purpose in
enacting it was to suppress or exalt speech of a certain content, or it
differentiates based on the content of speech on its face."' 1 24 Thus, a
court could find an ordinance to be content-based if the evidence showed
119. The language of Redondo Beach Municipal Code § 3-7.1601 ("It shall be
unlawful for any person to stand on a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to
solicit, employment, business, or contributions from an occupant of any motor
vehicle. . . .") is almost the same as Section 72.17(C) of the Town Code of the Town
of Cave Creek (making it unlawful for someone "to stand on or adjacent to a street
or highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions
from the occupant of any vehicle"). Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1031. Thus, the Lopez
court's determination that Section 72.17(C) is a content-based restriction because it
requires "an official ... [to] examine the content of the message that is conveyed"
could apply to the Redondo Beach ordinance as well. Id. at 1032-33 (internal
quotations omitted).
120. Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 (omissions in original). The violation of
this ordinance "constitutes a civil traffic offense, which can result in a civil penalty
not to exceed $250." Id.
121. Id.
122. When a statute is found to be content-based, the court writes that "it is
presumptively unconstitutional, and must satisfy strict scrutiny, i.e. be the least
restrictive means to further a compelling interest." Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1032.
123. 466 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2006).
124. Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d. at 1032 (citing ACLUII, 466 F.3d at 793).
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that the government either wanted to patently censor certain conduct
because it disagreed with the substance of the content, or if it seeks to
selectively exclude certain kinds of conduct or speech. In describing the
plaintiffs' arguments, the court writes "[pilaintiffs do not argue that the
Town enacted the Ordinance because of its disagreement with the
message solicitation-speech conveys. Rather, Plaintiffs assert that the
Ordinance is content-based because it bans only certain types of
solicitation speech."l 25 The court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention
that Town Code Section 72.17(C) is content-based as it singles out
solicitation, specifically the solicitation of employment, but not other
forms of solicitation.126
The critical point in the opinion is how the Lopez court
distinguished the ordinance at issue, and its decision, from that in
ACORN v. City of Phoenix,12 7 the main case that the Comitj de
Jornaleros court used to uphold the city of Redondo Beach's ordinance
targeted at day laborers. First, the Lopez court, making a similar point
argued by Judge Wardlaw in Comit de Jornaleros, 12 found that
ACORN should only control in relation to its narrow facts, which focused
on solicitation of funds from occupants of vehicles.129 The Lopez court
125. Id.
126. See Id. at 1032-33. In supporting its argument that the ordinance is
content-based, the court writes:
[T]he Ordinance differentiates based on the content of speech
on its face. It prohibits solicitation speech, but not political,
religious, artistic, or other categories of speech. It also
prohibits solicitation on the topics of "employment, business
or contributions," while allowing solicitation of votes or ballot
signatures. And, "[i]n order to enforce the regulation, an
official "must necessarily examine the content of the message
that is conveyed."'
Id. (quoting ACLUII, 466 F.3d at 794).
127. 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir.1986).
128. Comit6 de Jornaleros v. Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178, 1203 (9th Cir.
2010) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit's decision in ACORN should be read narrowly
as the opinion "focused entirely on the practice of in-person, immediate demands for
funds in the street that actually disrupt the driver from continuing on," as opposed to
allowing bans on all kinds of solicitation speech).
129. Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34. In this part of the opinion, the court
distinguishes between ACORN and ACLU II in deciding which case should apply.
The court finds that ACORN banned a specific act of solicitation, seeking donations
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stated that Town Code Section 72.17(C) "is an unconstitutional content-
based restriction on free speech,"130 as the ordinance seeks to repress
specific verbal forms of solicitation for employment, not just the
solicitation of funds like in A CORN.'3 1
The Lopez court made an important finding, one that has also
been advanced by some commentators:132 that the ordinance as written
would also be unconstitutional under an intermediate scrutiny "time,
place, and manner" analysis. The Lopez court found that "[e]ven if the
[Town Creek] Ordinance was content-neutral, it would still be an
impermissible time, place, and manner regulation because the Ordinance
is not narrowly tailored to further the Town's interests."l3 3 In structuring
its argument, the Lopez court first focused on whether the Town
established any significant interests served by the ordinance. The court
wrote that "[i]f the Town's interests are substantial, the Court must
determine whether the Ordinance 'burden[s] substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."'l
3 4
from occupants of vehicles, whereas ACLU H stood for the proposition that bans on
verbal solicitation would be content-based. The court then stated that "[u]nlike the
regulation at issue in ACORN, the Ordinance [passed by the town of Cave Creek] is
not limited to in-hand solicitation of funds, but rather bans the words of solicitation-
verbal appeals for employment. ACLU 11 therefore controls, not ACORN, and the
Ordinance is content-based." Id. at 1034.
130. Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
131. Id,
132. See Lewis, supra note 38, at 517-18. Lewis explains how ordinances
targeted at day laborers will have to be drafted in order to pass constitutional review.
She states that:
One possible approach would target only those types of
solicitation that cause the most danger to traffic safety, such as
solicitation requiring the solicited person to stop in the middle
of the traffic flow, or solicitation involving pedestrians darting
out into the street. An additional provision could focus on
motorists, criminalizing the act of stopping a car in the flow of
traffic ....
Id. at 519.
133. Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
134. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
Regarding how restrictive the ordinance may be in furthering the government's
substantial interest, the Lopez court states: "Although the Ordinance need not be 'the
least restrictive or intrusive means' of further the Town's interests, the Town 'may
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The court found that the Town established a substantial interest in
promoting traffic safety,13 yet found that the ordinance, in targeting a
day laborer's ability to solicit employment which at times results in
stopped vehicles, does not serve or promote the asserted interest of traffic
safety but rather seems to serve the unasserted interest of traffic flow.136
Of particular interest is the court's finding that some of the Town's
evidence, such as minutes from Town Council meetings, demonstrated
that "[t]o the extent that people mentioned a 'safety' concern, it appears
to be in reference to the safety of people from illegal immigrants, not
traffic safety."137
The Lopez court also found that the ordinance was not narrowly
tailored to an extent sufficient to pass intermediate scrutiny.1 38 The court
appeared to find the ordinance an unnecessary regulation to promote the
town's stated goal of traffic safety, because sufficient laws already
not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on
speech does not serve to advance its goals."' Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99).
135. Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1034 ("The Town asserts that it has a
significant governmental interest in traffic safety. The Court agrees."); see also
Lewis, supra note 38, at 490 ("Many cities enacting non-solicitation ordinances have
in fact used the stated government interests of traffic safety and quality of urban life
to support their regulations.").
136. Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. Here, the Lopez court finds that in order
for the Town to justify the ordinance, "[t]he Town must also provide evidence 'that
is reasonably believed to be relevant' that the Ordinance advances the asserted
interest in traffic safety." Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,
535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002)). The court goes on to assert that "[t]he Town has
provided no evidence that traffic safety is endangered by day laborers soliciting
employment from vehicle occupants." Id.
137. Id. at 1034-35. This assertion reinforces the argument that laws targeted
at day laborers are often more about addressing fears related to the presence of
immigrants in communities as opposed to specific concerns about day laborers. See
Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 575 ("Both the sheer scope and novel distribution of
immigration today compound the extent to which immigration implicates the
interests of localized political communities. State and local lawmakers are
responding to this shifting demography by attempting to exert control over
immigrant movement."); Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1566-69 (discussing the increase
in state and local regulation of immigrant populations as partly a result of increasing
immigration in the late 20th century and localities attempting to use their police
power to address alleged deficiencies in federal immigration law).
138. Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 ("Even assuming that the Town provided
sufficient support that the Ordinance advances its asserted interest in traffic safety,
though, the Ordinance is still not narrowly tailored.").
existed to provide the necessary means for the town to adequately
promote the goal of traffic safety.139 This argument closely matched that
presented by Judge Wardlaw in her Comit de Jornaleros dissent, in
which she stated that "the City [of Redondo Beach] can simply enforce
its existing traffic and safety ordinances to eliminate its articulated
concerns [of promoting traffic safety and flow]." 4 0
When the Ninth Circuit rehears Comit de Jornaleros, one
desirable outcome would be for the court to adopt Judge Wardlaw's
position and ask whether ordinances targeted at day laborers are truly
necessary in light of pre-existing ordinances giving police latitude to
promote the oft-cited interests of traffic safety and flow. On rehearing,
the court should heed the words of Collins v. Jordan,14 cited by the
Lopez court: "'The generally accepted way of dealing with unlawful
conduct that may be intertwined with First Amendment activity is to
punish it after it occurs rather than to prevent the First Amendment
activity from occurring in order to obviate the possible unlawful
conduct."'l42 The court should not allow an infringement on a day
laborer's First Amendment rights to stand if it is not truly necessary,
especially since ordinances like Town Code Section 72.17(C) lead to
"day laborers[] fac[ing] not only the loss of First Amendment freedoms,
but also the loss of employment opportunities necessary to support
themselves and their families." 1 43 To avoid this undesirable outcome, on
rehearing Comit de Jornaleros the Ninth Circuit should apply the Lopez
court's interpretation ofACLUIJ to Redondo Beach Municipal Code § 3-
7.1601 and find it a content-based restriction, as it requires authorities to
discern the message conveyed by day laborers before enforcing the
ordinance.
139. Id. (citing other existing ordinances in the Town of Cave Creek that cover
traffic, parking, and loitering regulations).
140. Comit6 de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 607
F.3d 1178, 1209 (9th Cir. 2010) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
141. 110 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1996).
142. Id. at 1035 (quoting Collins, 110 F.3d at 1371-72).
143. Lopez, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
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C. Parallel Cases: Restricting Pan-Handling
Ordinances that target pan-handling and the ability for people
facing homelessness to gather in public spaces provide additional insight
regarding how courts interpret and test state action restricting the First
Amendment activities of vulnerable groups. Similarly to day laborers,
many people facing homelessness rely on the use of public spaces for
important activities critical to their survival, such as finding a place to
sleepl45 or getting money through begging.146 It is noted that "[i]n the
absence of effective federal legislation, 14 state and city governments
have been left largely to their own devices to manage the problems posed
by local homeless populations."148
144. There is some overlap between ordinances targeted at day laborers and
those targeted at the homeless. In some cases, states and localities use laws
originally targeted at the homeless and vagrant to regulate the presence of day
laborers on streets or other public places. See Kettles, supra note 9, at 144
(describing how certain localities have shifted the focus of vagrancy ordinances
toward restricting the ability for day laborers to solicit employment in public
spaces); Lewis, supra note 38, at 508 ("Homeless panhandlers are just as likely to
harass, litter, publicly relieve themselves, and make 'undesirable uses of public
property' as are day laborers."). Lewis' comments allude to another correlation
between day laborers and pan-handlers, which is that in the eyes of some people they
pose the similar problem of negatively affecting the attractiveness of certain city or
town areas. See id. at 508-10 (describing the government's argument that day
laborers affect the "quality of urban life"); Andrew J. Liese, Note, We Can Do
Better: Anti-Homeless Ordinances as Violations of State Substantive Due Process
Law, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2006) (stating that proponents of a ordinance to
ban begging in the downtown area of Nashville, Tennessee, argued that the
ordinance was necessary because beggars made the downtown area less attractive to
tourists and others).
145. See Liese, supra note 144, at 1444 ("[A] law prohibiting sleeping in
public is arguably intended exclusively to protect a city's aesthetic image.").
146. See id at 1418 (providing a detailed description of the causes of
homelessness). "Homelessness is most commonly a consequence of unemployment,
low wages, rising housing costs, or any combination thereof." Id.
147. See id. at 1415 (stating that the only significant federal legislation
targeting homelessness is the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of
1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11472 (2006), which focuses on promoting services for
the homeless).
148. Id. at 1415; see Louis A. Modugno, Comment, Brother Can You Spare a
Dime?: The Panhandler's First Amendment Right to Beg, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
In describing how states and localities have addressed the issue
of homelessness, one author noted that "[m]any local governments have
responded to the problems caused by homelessness by criminalizing
certain conduct commonly associated with homelessness, such as
begging, sleeping or camping in public, and loitering."1 49 To pose a First
Amendment challenge toward ordinances restricting begging, another
commentator, Louis Modugno, wrote that "begging first must be
classified as speech."150 Modugno identified a split among the courts
regarding whether begging is classified as speech; this question is
strikingly similar to the issue of whether solicitation amounts to
151
commercial speech or expressive conduct in the day laborer cases.
Modugno stated that: "Some courts have refused to classify begging as
speech, determining that begging is more conduct than speech and,
therefore, lacking expression. Conversely, other courts have categorized
panhandling as speech because it conveys a message worthy of First
Amendment protection."152 In identifying when courts have found
begging to equate to speech, one can possibly better predict whether that
court would view a day laborer soliciting employment in a public space
as commercial speech or expressive conduct.
One of the most prominent cases in which begging was found to
be expressive conduct is Loper v. New York City Police Department.1 5 3
In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the
Southern District Court of New York's certification of "a plaintiff class
consisting of all 'needy persons who live in the State of New York, who
681, 683 (1995) ("Over thirty-five states and many municipalities have enacted
statutes prohibiting begging in public places.").
149. Liese, supra note 144, at 1415-16; see Modugno, supra note 148, at 683.
150. Modugno, supra note 148, at 685-86.
151. See Comit6 de Jornerlos de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,
607 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing whether a day laborer's
solicitation of employment constitutes commercial speech or expressive conduct and
finding that the solicitation at issue is expressive conduct); id at 1199 (Wardlaw, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority incorrectly states that the ordinance at issue
only regulated conduct and discussing why the ordinance also regulates commercial
speech).
152. Modugno, supra note 144, at 686 (citations omitted).
153. 999 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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beg on the public streets or in the public parks of New York City,"'"
5 4
and found that an anti-loitering law under the New York Penal Code was
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.15 5 Specifically at issue in
Loper was N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1),' which stated that a person
could be found guilty of loitering if he "'[1]oiters, remains or wanders
about in a public place for the purpose of begging."" 57 Although the
New York Police Department argued that no speech interest was
implicated in the statute, the Second Circuit found that the statute
"prohibits speech as well as conduct of a communicative nature." 59
160
In an argument similar to that used by the court in Lopez and
Judge Wardlaw in Comit de Jornaleros,161 the Second Circuit in Loper
refuted the New York City Police Department's argument that the
ordinance was necessary to combat the alleged harms caused by begging
because there existed numerous pre-existing statutes l6 giving the police
154. Loper, 999 F.2d at 701 (quoting Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 802 F.
Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D.N.Y.1992)). The district court defined a "needy person" as
"someone who, because of poverty, is unable to pay for the necessities of life, such
as food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and transportation." Loper, 802 F.Supp. at
1033.
155. Loper, 999 F.2d at 701.
156. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1989).
157. Loper, 999 F.2d at 701 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1)
(McKinney 1989)).
158. Id. at 701.
159. Id. at 702.
160. See Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, Ariz., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1035 (D.
Ariz. 2008).
161. See Comit6 de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,
607 F.3d 1178, 1209 (9th Cir. 2010) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
162. See Loper, 999 F.2d at 701-02. In describing the other laws available to
address any ill effects arising from begging, the court states:
[T]he crime of harassment in the first degree is committed by
one who follows another person in or about a public place or
places or repeatedly commits acts that place the other person in
reasonable fear of physical injury. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25
(McKinney Supp. 1993). If a panhandler, with intent to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, uses obscene or
abusive language or obstructs pedestrian or vehicular traffic,
he or she is guilty of disorderly conduct. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
240.20(3), (5) (McKinney 1989). A beggar who accosts a
person in a public place with intent to defraud that person of
705
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the necessary authority to adequately address any problems that might
arise.163 The Loper court then distinguished the pre-existing statutes
addressing possible problems arising from vagrancy with the statute at
issue by finding that the pre-existing statutes focused on conduct while
the statute at issue targets speech and "conduct of a communicative
nature."1 6 4 The court then focused on the "alternative channels" analysis
by distinguishing Loper from Young v. New York City Transit
Authority,165 a case in which the Second Circuit upheld a ban on begging
in the New York City subways as constitutional under the First
Amendment.166 The Second Circuit distinguished the ordinance in Young
from the ordinance in Loper because in Young there were sufficient
alternative means of communicating needs.167 The Loper court
explained that "[t]he case before us does prohibit begging throughout the
City and does leave individual beggars without the means to
communicate their individual wants and needs."1 6 8
money is guilty of fraudulent accosting. Id. § 165.30(1). The
crime of menacing in the third degree is committed by a
panhandler who, by physical menace, intentionally places or
attempts to place another person in fear of physical injury.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.15 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
Id.
163. Id. at 701 ("It is ludicrous, of course, to say that a statute that prohibits
only loitering for the purpose of begging provides the only authority that is available
to prevent and punish all the socially undesirable conduct incident to begging
described by the City Police.").
164. Id. at 702.
165. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
166. See Loper, 999 F.2d at 702 (discussing the Second Circuit's analysis and
findings in Young).
167. Id. Here, the Loper court discusses the Second Circuit's decision in
Young:
Most pertinent to our analysis in the case at bar, we stated:
"Under the regulation, begging is prohibited only in the
subway, not throughout all of New York City. It is untenable
to suggest, as do the plaintiffs, that absent the opportunity to
beg and panhandle in the subway system, they are left with no
means to communicate to the public about needy persons."
Id. (quoting Young, 903 F.2d at 160).
168. Loper, 999 F.2d at 702.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Loper court made a similar
analysis to that made in Town of Herndon v. Thomas,169 a case dealing
with an ordinance affecting day laborers. The court in Town of Herndon
found that the effect of an ordinance banning the solicitation of
employment on public streets effectively prevented day laborers from
seeking employment and that no "ample alternative channels" existed
where day laborers could find employment. 70 Thus, both the Loper and
Town of Herndon decisions shed light on the need for "ample alternative
channels" for those affected by statutes restricting conduct protected by
the First Amendment. Individuals engaging in such conduct, whether
begging or soliciting employment, must still be permitted to effectively
engage in their desired speech activity with sufficiently similar success
as was achieved in the now restricted channel.
III. REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES: THE STATE OF THE LAW AND
AFFIRMING THE RIGHT OF DAY LABORERS TO SOLICIT EMPLOYMENT
For day laborers, one potentially effective reasonable alternative
to soliciting employment on sidewalks and street corners is going to a
labor or worker center. Worker centers have the potential to provide a
number of protections and services to day laborers. However, there are
also concerns about the limits of worker centers, as evidenced by Kettles
who writes: "Tying aid in the form of food, education, and referral
services to occupation seems unduly narrow and likely to lead to
inconsistent levels of service being delivered to otherwise similarly
situated claimants."l 72 This is not to say that attempts to form worker
centers should be abandoned but only that they cannot serve as a
complete solution to problems facing day laborers.
169. 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 161 (Va. Cir. Aug. 29, 2007).
170. Town of Herndon, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS, at *15-18 (discussing how the
ordinance at issue left day laborers with no sufficient alternative means to find
employment, which they had been able to do prior to the enforcement of the
ordinance).
171. See Eli Naduris-Weissman, Article, The Worker Center Movement and
Traditional Labor Law: A Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232,
243-45 (2009) (giving an overview of day labor worker centers and profiling the
operations of a specific worker center).
172. Kettles, supra note 9, at 179.
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Some cases have addressed the issue of whether a worker center
constitutes a sufficient reasonable alternative when an ordinance prevents
a day laborer from soliciting employment in a public forum. The Town of
Herndon decision established that a temporary site where day laborers
could solicit employment is not sufficient as an "alternative channel."'13
The court found that "[b]y specifically describing the assembly site as
temporary, the Town clearly intends for the site to exist for an uncertain
period of time. However, the Ordinance regulating vehicular
employment solicitation except at its temporary assembly site does not
have a similar temporal element." 74 As some commentators described,
day laborers need access to hiring sites where they can negotiate
employment possibilities with willing contractors.175 As discussed in
Town of Herndon, a temporary hiring site would be considered an
insufficient "alternative channel" as it does not constitute a longer-term
solution for day laborers to continue to have access to contractors
looking to hire them.176 Thus, day laborers must rely on their First
Amendment rights to allow them access to sufficient employment
opportunities, either by prohibiting ordinances that bar their ability to
solicit employment or by granting them access to hiring sites that provide
similar employment opportunities as would be available to a day laborer
in an informal market.
For day laborers, one of most common "alternative channels" is
a day labor agency that serves the same purpose as informal hiring sites.
The situational background of Town of Herndon demonstrates some of
the limitations posed by day labor agencies as an alternative channel. 177
Town officials initially responded to the presence of day laborers by
creating a center where day laborers could congregate and be hired by
contractors.178 However, "[m]any local residents opposed the center,
primarily because it did not verify the immigration status of workers and
173. Town of Herndon, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS, at *15 ("[T]his temporary
assembly site is insufficient to show that the Ordinance leaves open 'ample
alternative channels."').
174. Id.
175. VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at 1.
176. Town ofHerndon, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS, at *15.
177. Pritchard, supra note 35, at 371-73 (discussing various community
reactions to day laborers and a day labor agency in the town of Herndon).
178. Id. at 371.
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ultimately voted to unseat the mayor and city council members who
created it."1 79
Given that many day laborers are unauthorized workers,'so the
situation surrounding the Town of Herndon provides an example of the
difficulties facing day laborers and their ability to have effective access
to employment opportunities. In some instances, day labor agencies are
realistic options in communities that support them. Law professor
Cristina Rodriguez stated that day labor "centers have arisen as a
response to a public safety need, and to facilitate a form of labor that has
benefits for everyone involved. They also help prevent worker
exploitation by bringing hiring activity into a public and regularized
setting."l82 This argument highlights the many benefits of day labor
agencies. However, as another law professor, Gregg Kettles, observed:
Recent experience with indoor day labor work
centers operated by government and nonprofit
organizations demonstrates that they do a poor job
helping day laborers find work. Offering fewer
work opportunities than the street, they are shunned
by many workers. Their institutionalization and
formalization of work makes them eerily similar to
public homeless shelters, which promised
independence and hope but delivered dependence
and despair.18
Both Kettles' observations and the closing of the day labor
center at issue in the Town of Herndon case highlight the limitations of
day labor agencies as a comprehensively effective "alternative channel"
for day laborers to solicit employment. To fully safeguard day laborers'
ability to find sufficient employment opportunities, courts should be
hesitant to find worker centers, whether temporary or permanent, as
effective alternative means for day laborers to solicit employment.
179. Id.; see also Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 599 (describing the situation
regarding the Town of Herndon and day laborers).
180. See VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at 17.
181. See Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 596-600 (discussing how day labor
agencies can be one effective response for local governments to help day laborers
and immigrant communities generally to better integrate into the community).
182. Id. at 600.
183. Kettles, supra note 9, at 141.
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Although worker centers can help day laborers in many ways, courts
should not allow the presence of a worker center to justify prohibitions
on a day laborer's ability to solicit employment in public fora.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even with the economic downturn, day laborers will continue to
play an important role in the economy.184 The ongoing need for day
laborers and the lack of comprehensive immigration reform creates a
difficult situation for immigrant day laborers who may want to join the
formal economy. But with few, if any, realistic options, they will have to
rely on the unpredictable day labor market. For day laborers to find
work, they must be able to make themselves known to willing
contractors who need to hire temporary workers.' 85 In the communities
where day labor markets exist, city and municipal officials and planners
face balancing the need for day laborers to have realistic employment
options along with the government's interests in promoting public safety
and avoiding alleged nuisances brought about by informal day labor
hiring sites.
The presence and practices of day laborers draw attention to First
Amendment concerns by raising questions such as to what extent do day
laborers have the right to gather and solicit employment in public spaces
and especially when state or local governments may impose restrictions
on that right. As this Note has discussed, there have been mixed results
when courts have validated or invalidated different statutory regimes
meant to exclude day laborers from public spaces. Governments face
challenges in drafting legislation broad enough as to be considered
"content-neutral" but not so broad as to infringe or affect unintended
parties, which could also lead to selective enforcement or overbreadth
challenges to the statutes. More importantly for day laborers, this Note
184. REAVIS, supra note 12, at 173-74 (discussing the ongoing need for
temporary work arrangements).
185. See Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, Ariz., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1036 (D.
Ariz. 2008) ("Plaintiffs, as day laborers, face not only the loss of First Amendment
freedoms, but also the loss of employment opportunities necessary to support
themselves and their families.").
186. See Kettles, supra note 9, at 144-45 (discussing the various challenges
facing the viability of ordinances targeted at day laborers such as First Amendment
2011] TIME, PLACE, & MANNER OF SURVIVAL 711
addresses the benefits, and limitations, of day labor agencies. Although
agencies have in many cases benefited day laborers, the instances of
community backlash due to concerns about facilitating the hiring of
unauthorized workers presents challenges to policy-makers and
advocates seeking to work together with day laborers to improve
-187
employment options and worker protections.
Without comprehensive immigration reform, it will be difficult
to adequately addresses the needs of day laborers and help states and
localities address issued raised by the presence of unauthorized
workers. Any comprehensive immigration reform package should
include provisions that allow immigrant day laborers to take advantage
of services offered by employment agencies and encourage local
governments to fund and support such centers. In the absence of such
centers, day laborers should be allowed to continue using public places to
solicit employment. Instead of creating new statutory regimes directed at
day laborers, local governments can use existing laws to address any
intermittent problems such as excessive noise or littering.' 89
Those concerned about day laborers and First Amendment
protections should watch closely for the result of the en banc rehearing of
concerns as well as preemption issues related to state law under certain
circumstances). See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 801 (1984) (providing an outline of how the Supreme Court decides whether a
statute is overbroad in the context of the First Amendment). "[T]here must be a
realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially
challenged on overbreadth grounds." Id.
187. See Pritchard, supra note 35, at 371-72 (discussing various community
responses to a day labor center created by the town of Herndon, Virgina). Pritchard
states that "Many local residents opposed the center - primarily because it did not
verify the immigration status of workers - and ultimately voted to unseat the mayor
and city council members who created it." Id.
188. See, Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 570 ("Congress's inability to pass
comprehensive immigration reform in recent years likely means that states and
localities will continue to be highly active in this area [of passing laws specifically
targeted at immigrant communities].").
189. See Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,
607 F.3d 1178, 1209 (9th Cir. 2010) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) ("[T]he City can
simply enforce its existing traffic and safety ordinances to eliminate its articulated
concerns."); Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1035 (D. Ariz.
2008) ("There are myriad of less restrictive means for the City to promote traffic
safety, such as enforcement of existing traffic, parking, and loitering laws.").
Comit de Jornaleros, as this decision will likely impact the viability of
other ordinances targeted at day laborers. On rehearing, the Ninth
Circuit should find Redondo Beach Municipal Code §37.1601
unconstitutional. One option is for the Ninth Circuit to make a finding
similar to that of Lopez and hold that the ordinance is content-based and
must pass strict scrutiny. In the alternative, the Ninth Circuit should
adopt the approach advocated in Judge Wardlaw's dissent and find the
ordinance unconstitutional due to not being narrowly tailored or not
allowing sufficient alternative means for day laborers to seek
employment. Such a decision could go a long way toward discouraging
other states and localities from passing restrictive anti-day laborer
measures, and allow day laborers an effective opportunity to make
themselves known to employers and have a greater opportunity to find
adequate employment. 190
190. Although the ability of day laborers to solicit employment is important to
economic livelihood, there are still many other issues to address regarding the
treatment of day laborers. See, e.g., VALENZUELA, supra note 5, at ii, 6, 12 (noting
problems such as lack of workplace protections, wage theft, and low rates of pay).
As these abuses can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that many day laborers
are unauthorized workers, comprehensive immigration reform providing a viable
path to citizenship would be one significant measure to help reduce employment
difficulties faced by day laborers. Id. at 26.
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